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Abstract
This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generations model with human cap-
ital accumulation and the choice to opt out of public education. The model demon-
strates the mutual interaction between inequality and education choice and shows
that the interaction leads to two, locally stable steady-state equilibria. The exis-
tence of multiple stable equilibria implies a negative correlation between inequality
and enrollment in public education, which is consistent with evidence from OECD
countries. This study also presents a welfare analysis using data from OECD coun-
tries and shows that introducing a compulsory public education system leaves the
rst generation worse o, though improves welfare for future generations of the
lower-class individuals. The results also suggest that the two equilibria are not
Pareto-ranked.
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1 Introduction
Compulsory school attendance laws, enforced in nearly all developed countries, require
parents to have their children attend public or private school for a designated period.
Public school is entirely funded by local and state taxes, whereas private school obtain
funding by charging their students tuition. Parents can choose either depending on their
income and preferences. Because public schooling is a kind of government intervention,
higher income parents who benet less from public schooling are more likely to choose
private schools. Therefore, we expect an association between higher inequality and higher
enrollments in private education institutions, as observed in data from OECD countries
illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here.]
de la Croix and Doepke (2009) develop a political economy theory that attempts to
explain the relationship between inequality and private education and show that their
theory is consistent with data from both states in the U.S. and cross-country evidence.
They assume an exogenous income distribution and analyze the eect of expanding in-
equality on education choices; however, their analysis implies a reverse eect, that is, an
eect of education on inequality. Recent studies suggest that the reverse eect is also
important (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Zhang, 1996) and exists across countries and
within countries over time (De Gregorio and Lee, 2002; Teulings and van Rens, 2008).
The presence of the reverse eect implies that there is a mutual interaction of inequality
and education choice over time - inequality aects adults' choice of education and policy,
and this, in turn, determines inequality within the next generation. Cardak (2004a, 2004b)
attempts to demonstrate this mutual interaction of education choice and inequality in a
two-period overlapping-generations model. In particular, Cardak (2004a) calibrates the
model to the US economy, and shows by simulation that the coexistence of public and
private education polarizes the income distribution. He therefore focuses on education
choice and inequality within a country over time.
The present study instead focuses on the cross-country dierences and aims to clarify
the causes of the dierences observed in Figure 1 from the political economy point of
view. For this purpose, we follow a simple two-class, overlapping-generations model with
human capital accumulation as in Gradstein and Justman (1996) and de la Croix and
Doepke (2004). We extend their frameworks by introducing the choice to opt out of
public education as Cardak (2004a, 2004b) does. In particular, the model in this study
has two types of family dynasties classied according to their level of human capital (i.e.,
low-type and high-type). Agents from either type of family enter adulthood with a stock
of human capital invested by their parents, earn after-tax income, and obtain utility from
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consumption and their children's human capital. Agents compare the maximized utility
under each type of education, and choose one with the highest value.
Every adult agent votes on public education expenditures in each period. This study
assumes that most families are of the low-type. We compute the low-type's preferred
public education expenditure, and analyze the corresponding education choice by type
of an adult agent. We show that the low-type adults always choose public education
because they pay less than they receive from public education. However, the high-type's
decision depends on income inequality. As inequality increases, the income discrepancy
between the two types increases, and so does the high-type's tax burden. Therefore, high-
type adults opt out of public education when inequality is high, while they choose public
education when inequality is low.
The current education choice and expenditures inuence human capital formation,
which, in turn, determines inequality in the next generation. We demonstrate this mu-
tual interaction between inequality and education across generations and show that the
interaction leads to two, locally stable steady-state equilibria. One steady state shows
a polarized income distribution with high-type agents opting out of public education, in
line with Cardak (2004a). The other steady state has perfect equality and full enrollment
in public education. This study is novel in that it shows the existence of multiple stable
equilibria that imply that higher inequality is associated with lower enrollment in public
schools. This model prediction is consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 1.
To investigate the welfare implications of the model, we compare the two steady states
in terms of utility by considering an economic environment in which the equilibrium con-
verges to the higher-inequality steady state. We then introduce an alternative education
system into this environment, that is, a compulsory public school system that prohibits
students from opting out of public school. This system forces the economy into the
lower-inequality steady state. Therefore, we can evaluate the multiple, stable steady-
state equilibria by comparing the higher-inequality steady state in the mixed education
system and the steady state in the compulsory public school system.
We show by simulation that every generation of the high-type is made worse o by the
introduction of the compulsory public schooling since expenditures on education depart
from their optimal levels. However, the new system has a mixed eect on the low-type
agents. The rst generation is made worse o since the per-capita public education
expenditure decreases. From generation 2 onward, there is a positive eect from the
compulsory public schooling on human capital formation. This eect may outweigh the
negative eect of the decrease in the per capita public education expenditure. The result
suggests an intergenerational tradeo and that the two equilibria are not Pareto-ranked.
The result also suggests that the shift from a mixed education system to a compulsory
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public school system that aims to improve equality, is not Pareto-improving.
This study is related to three strands of literature. The rst is the static analyses
of public and private education choices (e.g., Stiglitz, 1974; Epple and Romano, 1996;
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998; Hoyt and Lee, 1998; Bearse, Glomm and Patterson, 2005;
de la Croix and Doepke, 2009; Arcalean and Schiopu, 2016). This study advances this
earlier work by demonstrating the dynamic interaction of inequality and education choice,
and in particular, complements Cardak's (2004a, 2004b) work by showing the existence
of multiple stable equilibria that t the cross-country evidence from OECD countries.
The second is the dynamic inequality analyses in a given (public or private) education
regime (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Gradstein and
Justman, 1997; de la Croix and Doepke, 2004). However, this study departs from prior
work by allowing for endogenous education choice accompanied by voting on education
policy. Gradstein and Justman (1996) and Ono (2016) conduct a similar analysis, though
focus on private education as a supplement to public education. The present study instead
focuses on the ability to opt out of public education, which leads to novel implications for
the multiplicity and eciency of equilibria.
The third strand relates to political economy analyses of redistribution and private ed-
ucation (Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2003; Hassler, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti, 2007; Arawatari and Ono, 2009, 2013). In earlier frameworks, multiple, self-
fullling expectations of agents on future in-cash redistribution policies create two types
of equilibria: one characterized by low inequality and high redistribution, the other char-
acterized by high inequality and low redistribution. This multiple-equilibria story implies
a negative correlation between inequality and redistribution. While this is relevant to our
present study, these earlier works consider private education and in-cash transfers, while
our study instead focuses on in-kind public education provision and allows for private
education as an alternative choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 considers agents' voting behavior and describes the political equilibrium in
each period. Section 4 shows the existence and stability of a steady-state equilibrium
and claries the role of structural parameter values in the determination of inequality,
individual education choice, and policy. Section 5 presents a welfare analysis of the
political equilibria in addition to considering the welfare implications of a compulsory
public schooling system as an alternative. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. All
proofs are provided in Appendix.
3
2 Model
We consider a discrete-time, overlapping-generations economy beginning at time 1. The
economy is populated by individuals who live in two periods (youth and adulthood)
belonging to one of two types of family dynasties indexed by i 2 fL;Hg. This assumption
is unrealistic, but it enables us to demonstrate the dynamic motion of inequality in a
tractable way.
A type-i adult in period 1 is endowed with hi1 units of human capital, where 0 < h
L
1 <
hH1 . Thus, type-L and type-H individuals in period-1 have low and high human capital,
respectively. Additionally, we assume that there is no social mobility between the two
classes because we are more concerned with the relative changes in inequality over time.
Each adult produces one child, thus the population remains constant from generation
to generation. The fraction of type-L individuals within each generation is , leaving
1  as the proportion of type-H individuals, where  is constant across generations and
satises 0:5 <  < 1. Therefore, type-L individuals are the majority in the economy in
every period, which reects the real-world right-skewed income distribution.
2.1 Preferences and Budget Constraints
Upon entering adulthood at time t, a type-i individual has a stock of human capital hit
that denes his or her eective labor capacity. He or she then inelastically supplies his
or her human capital to rms to receive wages. We assume that wages are normalized to
one in each period, implying that labor income is equal to the human capital level.
A type-i adult of generation t derives utility from his or her current consumption, cit,
and from his or her child's anticipated future income, hit+1. Consequently, we can express
his or her preferences with the following utility function
uit = ln c
i
t +  lnh
i
t+1;
where (> 0) is a common parameter that reects the bequest motive. We employ this
logarithmic utility function to make our analysis more manageable.
Adults have a choice between public and private education for their children, which
they choose based on maximum utility. However, regardless of their choice, they must
pay income taxes to nance public education. Therefore, the budget constraint of a type-i
adult in period t is
cit + e
i
t  (1  t)hit;
where eit( 0) denotes private education expenditure.
The child's level of education, hit+1, is determined by his or her parents' human capital,
hit, and the parents' choice of schooling, either q
i
t = xt or e
i
t, where xt is per capita public
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education. In particular, we assume
hit+1 = D
 
hit
1   
qit

;
qit 2

xt; e
i
t
	
;
where D(> 0) is the total factor productivity of human capital and  2 (0; 1) is the
elasticity of schooling. We assume the following with respect to  and .
Assumption 1.  2 (0; 1).
Assumption 1 is satised as long as  2 (0; 1). In Section 5, we estimate  based on
data from OECD countries and nd that  = 0:151: This estimate ts well with Cardak's
(2004a) estimate of 0:13 and de la Croix and Deopke's (2004) estimate of 0:169.
2.2 Education Choice
Given the tax rate, public education, and his or her human capital, each adult chooses
consumption and education to maximize his or her utility subject to the budget constraint.
In particular, he or she compares the maximum utility of each education choice and
chooses the option with the highest value.
Suppose that type-i adults choose private education. The adult solves the utility
maximization problem by allocating disposable income between private education and
consumption as in the following:
eit =

1 + 
(1  t)hit;
cit =
1
1 + 
(1  t)hit:
The type-i adult's utility from providing private education for his or her child, denoted
by V ie;t, is
V ie;t = (1 + ) ln(1  t)hit +

ln
1
1 + 
+  ln

1 + 

+  lnD
 
hit
1 
: (1)
Alternatively, suppose that the type-i adult chooses public education. The agent
chooses eit = 0; and thus consumes all disposable income. In this case, the type-i adult's
utility from choosing public education for his or her child, denoted by V ix;t, is
V ix;t = ln(1  t)hit +  lnD
 
hit
1 
+  lnxt: (2)
Given a set of policies, (xt; t), each adult chooses between education alternatives for
their children in terms of utility maximization. Therefore, type-i adults choose public
education if and only if the following condition holds:
V ix;t > V
i
e;t ,

(1 + )(1+)=
(1  t)hit < xt: (3)
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We assume that each adult chooses private education when the two alternatives are in-
dierent.
We add an inequality index into our framework to reformulate the condition in (3) in
terms of the index. Let ht denote the average human capital in period t; ht  hLt + (1 
)hHt ; and let t denote the ratio of h
L
t to ht;
t  h
L
t
ht
2 (0; 1] :
The index t suggests that a larger (smaller) t implies a lower (higher) income inequality
between the high-type and low-type groups, and thus a more equal (unequal) society.
Using this inequality index and the denition for average human capital, we can rewrite
the ratio hHt =ht as
hHt
ht
=
1  t
1   :
Using this index, we reformulate the condition in (3). First, consider the case where
only type-L adults choose public education. The government budget constraint is xt =
tht where xt is the aggregate public education expenditure for type-L agents and tht
is the aggregate tax revenue from the low-type and high-type individuals. Substituting
xt = tht into (3) and rearranging the terms, we obtain the condition for the type-L
adults to choose public education:
V Lx;t > V
L
e;t , xL (t; ht) 
t
t + (1 + )
(1+)=
ht < xt: (4)
The condition states that type-L adults choose public education when inequality is high
(that is, t is low). A higher inequality implies that type-L adults gain signicant in-kind
benets from public education also nanced by type-H adults.
Next, consider the case where both types of adults choose public education. The
government budget constraint is then xt = tht; where xt is the aggregate public education
expenditure for both type-L and type-H individuals. Substituting this constraint into (3)
and rearranging the terms, we obtain the condition for type-H adults to choose public
education:
V Hx;t > V
H
e;t , xH (t; ht) 
 1 t
1 
 1 t
1  + (1 + )
(1+)=
ht < xt: (5)
The condition states that type-H adults choose public education when inequality is low,
which implies low redistribution from type-H agents to type-L agents, and thus a low
cost of public education. This incentivizes type-H agents to choose public education.
To determine education choice of the both types of adults for a given xt, we compare
the two threshold values of xt; x
L (t; ht) and x
H (t; ht) ; and nd a critical value of t;
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denoted by ^, such that
xL (t; ht) 7 xH (t; ht), t 7 ^;
where ^ is dened by
^ 
n
(1 + )(1+)= + (1  )
o
 pz
2(1  ) ; (6)
and
p
z 
rn
(1 + )(1+)= + (1  )
o2
  4(1  ) (1 + )(1+)=:
Appendix A.1 provides the derivation of ^.
Given the denition of ^, we can present both types of agents' education choice. Let
(qL; qH) denote a pair of education choices, one by a type-L adult and the other by a
type-H adult. For example, (qL; qH) = (x; e) states that type-L adults choose public
education (x), while type-H adults choose private education (e). Given this notation and
the denition of ^, the choice for each type of agent for a given t and xt is classied as:
(a) For t 2 [^; 1) ;
(qL; qH) =

(e; e) if 0 < xt  xL (t; ht) ;
(x; x) if xL (t; ht) < xt < ht:
(7)
(b) For t 2 (0; ^)
(qL; qH) =
8<:
(e; e) if 0 < xt  xL (t; ht) ;
(x; e) if xL (t; ht) < xt  xH (t; ht) ;
(x; x) if xH (t; ht) < xt < ht:
(8)
We should note that in case (a), xH (t; ht)  xL (t; ht) holds, the pair (qL; qH) =
(x; e) never arises because the threshold value xH (t; ht) is irrelevant for type-H adults.
Around xH (t; ht), we assume that type-L adults choose public education. However, this
assumption fails in the range of
 
0; xL (t; ht)

, including xH (t; ht). Within this range,
type-L adults actually choose private education.
The timing of events in period t is as follows: First, adult agents vote on public
education, xt, and the tax rate is determined to satisfy the government's budget constraint.
Second, given xt, each agent chooses between public and private education to maximize
utility. In choosing private education, agents decides how to divide their disposable income
between consumption and private education subject to their budget constraint. We solve
the model by backward induction. Given the solution in the second stage presented thus
far, we solve the rst-stage problem in the next section.
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3 Voting
We assume that agents vote sincerely since every agent has zero mass and thus no indi-
vidual vote can change the outcome. In addition, in each period t; adult agents determine
public education through a political process of majority voting. Assuming  > 0:5; type-
L agents constitute the majority. Therefore, the political objective function in period t;
denoted by 
t; is the indirect utility function of adult type-L agents.
Substituting the government budget constraint into the indirect utility function for
type-L agents in (1) and rearranging the terms, we can express 
t as

t =
8><>:

ee;t  (1 + ) lnhtt +

ln 1
1+
+  ln 
1+

+  lnD (htt)
1  if (qL; qH) = (e; e);

xe;t  ln (ht   xt) t +  lnD (htt)1  +  lnxt if (qL; qH) = (x; e);

xx;t  ln (ht   xt) t +  lnD (htt)1  +  lnxt if (qL; qH) = (x; x):
(9)
The function 
ee;t is independent of public education expenditure (xt) because both types
of agents choose private education, whereas the functions 
xe;t and 
xx;t are dependent
on xt.
The solutions to maximize 
xe;t and 
xx;t are, respectively:
argmax
xe;t = x

t 

(1 + )
ht;
argmax
xx;t = x

t 

1 + 
ht (< x

t ) :
The solution xt = argmax
xe;t is feasible if it lies within the range
 
xL (t; ht) ; x
H (t; ht)

;
and the solution xt = argmax
xx;t is feasible if it lies within
 
xH (t; ht) ; ht

.
Given t and ht, a period-t voting solution is xt = argmax
t. In the following, we
consider (a) t 2 [^; 1) in (7) and (b) t 2 (0; ^) in (8).
3.1 Case (a): t 2 [^; 1)
Figure 2 illustrates an example of 
t when t 2 [^; 1). As demonstrated in (7), both
types of adults choose private education when per capita public education expenditure is
below the critical value xL (t; ht) and choose public education when it is above x
L (t; ht).
The solution is xt = argmax
xx;t if 
xx;tjxt=xt > 
ee;t as illustrated in Figure 2. The
following lemma shows that the sucient condition actually holds for t 2 [^; 1).
Lemma 1. For t 2 [^; 1), the period-t voting solution is xt = argmax
xx;t.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
[Figure 2 here.]
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Type-L adults pay less than they receive from public education and thus prefer public
education over private education. As the decisive voters, they choose per capita public
education expenditures given their expectations of type-H voters' choices. Type-H adults
may prefer private education to public education because they pay more than they receive
from public education. However, their costs to provide public education in terms of
utility decreases as t increases, that is, as their income level relative to the average,
hHt =ht = (1  t) = (1  ), decreases. In particular, if t is above ^; the benet in
terms of utility outweigh the cost of public education to type-H, and type-H adults
nd it optimal to choose public education. Therefore, if inequality is low enough that
^  t < 1, it is optimal for type-L adults to choose a per capita public education
expenditure of xt = argmax
xx;t, given the expectation that type-H adults also choose
public education.
3.2 Case (b): t 2 (0; ^)
In this case, each type's education choice is given by (8). One dierence from case (a)
is that the political objective might be maximized at xt 2
 
xL (t; ht) ; x
H (t; ht)

, where
type-H adults opt out of public education while type-L adults do not. We clarify the
range of the inequality index, t, that illustrates this case by comparing the two threshold
values of x; xL (t; ht) and x
H (t; ht) ; and the two solution candidates that maximize 
t;
xt and x

t .
First, we note that the following relationship holds:
xL (t; ht) < x

t 

1 + 
ht < x

t 

(1 + )
ht:
Second, we compare xH (t; ht) and x

t :8<: x

t  xH (t; ht) for t 2

0; 1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
oi
;
xt > x
H (t; ht) for t 2
h
1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
; ^

;
where the set
h
1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
; ^

is non-empty, as demonstrated in
Appendix A.3. Recall that the solution xt = argmax
xx;t is feasible if it lies within 
xH (t; ht) ; ht

. Therefore, the expression above states that the solution xt is not feasible
when inequality is high enough that t 
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
=, while it
is feasible when inequality is low enough that t >
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
=.
High inequality leads to a heavy tax burden on type-H adults, and thus gives them an
incentive to opt out of public education. However, once inequality passes the thresholdn
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
=, there is a strong preference for public education, even
if this comes at the expense of a tax burden.
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Finally, we compare xH (t; ht) and x

t
xH (t; ht) ? xt ,
h
  (1  )
n
 + (1 + )(1+)=
oi
? f (1 + )  gt;
(10)
where the right-hand side of (10) is positive assuming  > 0:5 and  < 1. Let  denote
the value of  that makes the left-hand side of (10) equal to zero:
   + (1 + )
(1+)=
(1 + ) + (1 + )(1+)=
2

1
2
; 1

:
Therefore, we consider the following two situations separately for case (b)
Case (b.1):  2 (; 1),   (1  )
n
 + (1 + )(1+)=
o
> 0;
Case (b.2):  2

1
2
; 

,   (1  )
n
 + (1 + )(1+)=
o
 0:
Figure 3 shows the classication according to  and t, and summarizes the voting
solutions for cases (a) and (b). Lemma 1 shows the solution for case (a). The following
analysis shows the derivations for subcases (b.1) and (b.2) in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 here.]
3.2.1 Case (b.1):  2 (; 1)
In case (b.1), the proportion of type-L agents is greater than . The condition in (10)
is thus reformulated as
xH (t; ht) ? xt
, t 7  
  (1  )
n
 + (1 + )(1+)=
o
 f (1 + )  g 2

0;
1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
:
Case (b.1) therefore has three subcases according to t:
Case (b.1.1): t 2 (0; ] where xt < xt  xH (t; ht) ;
Case (b.1.2): t 2

;
1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
where xt  xH (t; ht) < xt ;
Case (b.1.3): t 2

1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
; ^

where xH (t; ht) < x

t < x

t :
Panels (a), (b), and (c) in Figure 4 illustrate 
t for cases (b.1.1), (b.1.2), and (b.1.3),
respectively. The analysis of the gure leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 2. When  2 (; 1), the voting solution is
argmax
t =
8<:
xt if t 2 (0; ] ;
xH (t; ht) if t 2 (; ] ;
xt if t 2 (; ^) :
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
[Figure 4 here.]
To understand the statement in Lemma 2, consider rst case (b.1.1), in which inequal-
ity is high enough that t 2 (0; ] (see Panel (a) of Figure 4). Type-H adults with a
suciently high income level prefer private to public education. Given this choice, 
xe;t
is type-L's indirect utility function. As the decisive voters, they choose per capita public
education expenditure x that maximizes 
xe;t; x

t = argmax
xe;t:
Next, consider case (b.1.2), where inequality is high but less severe than that observed
in case (b.1.1). Type-H adults still prefer private to public education, but type-L adults
cannot choose an \interior" solution, xt = argmax
xe;t. Their choice is constrained by
the upper limit, xH (t; ht), as illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 4. We hereafter refer to
xH (t; ht) as a \corner" solution.
Finally, consider case (b.1.3), in which inequality is lower than in the previous two
cases. Since type-H's income level is relatively lower than that in the previous two cases,
type-H adults might prefer public to private education. There is a threshold of t, denoted
by ; such that

xe;tjxt=xH(t;ht) ? 
xx;tjxt=xt , t 7 
:
If inequality is high enough that t  , type-H adults choose private education and the
political objective is maximized at xt = x
H (t; ht) (see Panel (c) of Figure 4). However,
if inequality low enough that t > 
, type-H adults choose public education and the
political objective is maximized at xt = x

t .
3.2.2 Case (b.2):  2 (1=2; ]
In case (b.2), the proportion of type-L agents is below . Unlike case (b.1), the two
threshold values of t; 
 and
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
=, could be negative, that
is, either one or both become irrelevant. In fact, the denition of  implies
  0,   (1  )
n
 + (1 + )(1+)=
o
 0,   :
Thus, the current assumption of  2 (1=2; ] implies that the critical value of  is
irrelevant in case (b.2).
To explore the possibility that
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
= < 0, we reformulate
the expression as:
1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
? 0,  ?   (1 + )
(1+)=   1
(1 + )(1+)=
;
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where  > 1=2 holds, assuming  2 (0; 1). Therefore, we have
1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o  0 for  2  1
2
; 

;
> 0 for  2 (; ] : (11)
Based on the classication in (11), we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Assume  2 (1=2; ]. Given t and ht, the period-t voting solution is
argmax
t =

xH (t; ht) if t 2 (0; ] ;
xt if t 2 (; ^) :
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
A noteworthy feature is that an \interior" solution, xt = argmax
xe;t; is not feasible
when the proportion of type-L adults is low enough that  2 (1=2; ]. A low  implies a
small tax burden for each agent for a given level of public education expenditure, x: This
lowers the marginal cost of public education, thereby inducing type-L adults to prefer a
higher public education expenditure. However, type-H adults will opt out when the public
education expenditure is below xH (t; ht). If the expenditure is above x
H (t; ht) ; type-
H prefers public education to private education. Therefore, the upper limit, xH (t; ht),
constrains type-L's choice of public education as long as type-H adults opt out of public
education.
3.3 Voting Outcome and Education Choice
Summarizing the results in Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we obtain the voting solution in period
t and the corresponding education choice:
Proposition 1. Given the inequality index t; the period-t voting solution is
argmax
t =
8<:
xt if t 2 (; 1) ;
xt if t 2 (0; ] and  2 (; 1) ;
xH (t; ht) otherwise.
The corresponding education choice is 
qL; qH

=

(x; x) if t 2 (; 1) ;
(x; e) if t 2 (0; ] .
Proposition 1 states that type-H adults choose public education if inequality is low
enough that t 2 (; 1); otherwise they choose private education. A small t implies
a high income disparity between the two types of adults, so type-H adults owe a large
tax burden. In particular, if t  , this negative income eect dominates the positive
eect through public education provision. This incentivizes type-H adults to opt out of
public education. However, if inequality is low enough that t > 
, the negative income
eect is dominated by the positive eect of public education provision, and type-H adults
choose public education. Figure 3 illustrates the voting solution and the corresponding
education choice according to t and .
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4 Steady-state Equilibrium
The analysis in the previous section demonstrates public education expenditure as a
political outcome for a given inequality index (t). The current public education inuences
human capital formation, which in turn determines inequality in the next generation
(t+1). To demonstrate the mutual interaction between inequality and public education,
we show the inequality index movement across periods and the existence and stability of
a steady-state equilibrium in which t+1 = t holds along the equilibrium path. Based on
the description of the equilibrium, we examine how the structural parameters ; , and
 aect steady-state inequality and the choice of education.
Given an initial condition, 1(> 0); the political equilibrium sequence ftg is charac-
terized by the rst-order dierence equation, t+1 = P (t), where
P (t) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Px (t) 

+ (1  )

1
t
  
1  1
if t 2 (; 1) ;
P inte (t) 

+


1+

(1  t)

1
t
1  1
if t 2 (0; ] and  2 (; 1) ,
P core (t) 
h
+ (1  )

1 t
(1 )t
 n

1+
(1  t) + (1 + )1=
oi 1
otherwise.
where the subscript x (e) in P () implies that type-H adults choose public (private)
education and the superscript cor (int) implies a corner (interior) solution. The three
cases correspond to those in Proposition 1. Appendix A.6 provides the derivation of
Px () ; P inte () and P core ().
A closer analysis of P () reveals that the function has the following properties (see
Appendix A.7 for the formal proof of the following statement). First, Px () ; P core () ; and
P inte () are strictly increasing in t. Second, P inte () R P core () if and only if t R . Third,
P core () < Px () 8t 2 (0; 1). Fourth, Px () satises Px (1) = 1 and P 0x (1) = 1  2 (0; 1).
Fifth, P core () satises P core (0) = 0 and lim!0 (@P core () =@t) = 1; P inte () satises
P inte (0) = 0; and lim!0 (@P
int
e () =@t) = 1. These properties imply that (i) there is a
locally stable steady-state equilibrium with  = 1, and (ii) P () is strictly increasing in
t but discontinuous at t = 
. Figure 5 illustrates the possible patterns of P () when
 2 (; 1). The  2 (1=2; ] case is qualitatively similar, but the threshold value  is
negative and thus irrelevant. The gure suggests the following proposition.
[Figure 5 here.]
Proposition 2. If P core (
) > , there is a unique stable steady-state equilibrium
with  = 1 ; if P core (
)  , there are two locally stable steady-state equilibria,
one with  2 (0; ) and the other with  = 1.
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The unique stable steady-state equilibrium is distinguished by perfect equality between
the two types of agents and 100% enrollment in public school. However, another type
of equilibrium exists when the multiple stable steady states are realized, distinguished
by the presence of income inequality and type-H agents' opting out of public education.
Thus, the multiple steady states imply that higher inequality is associated with lower
enrollment in public school. This model prediction is consistent with empirical evidence
from OECD countries.
For an intuitive interpretation of the condition P core (
) ? , we reformulate it in
terms of the structural parameters  and , and nd that under the mild assumption,
there are threshold values denoted by  and , respectively, such that P core (
)  
if  <  and  < ; and P core (
) >  otherwise (see Appendix A.8). That is, the
model produces multiple steady-state equilibria if  <  and  < .
To explain this argument, we rst consider the case where  is below . A low
 means a low weight attached to the utility of children's human capital, and a low 
means low elasticity in human capital with respect to public education expenditure. These
factors imply that type-H agents determine a low benet from public education in terms
of utility. This in turn induces type-H agents to opt out of public education. Therefore,
a low  encourages an equilibrium with  < 1.
Next, we consider the role of  in the steady-state equilibria outcome. Recall the
denition of t+1  hLt+1=ht+1; or,
t+1  h
L
t+1
ht+1
=
hLt+1
hLt+1 + (1  )hHt+1
:
This expression indicates that the parameter  has two eects in the determination of
t+1. First, given h
H
t+1, a lower  implies a larger proportion of type-H agents. This leads
to a higher average human capital, ht+1, and thus a lower t+1  hLt+1=ht+1 for a given
hLt+1. Second, a lower  implies a lower aggregate public education expenditure and thus
a lower tax burden on type-H agents. This produces a positive income eect on private
education expenditure by type-H agents. This, in turn, increases type-H's human capital,
hHt+1, and the average human capital, ht+1, and thus decreases t+1. Because of these two
negative eects, the model produces an equilibrium with t+1 < 1 if  is below .
However, an economy with low  and  also has an equilibrium with  = 1 provided
that the initial condition of  is high. A higher 1 implies a lower income gap and thus
lower income for type-H agents. Because of this negative income eect, type-H agents
nd it optimal to choose public education over private education. Therefore, there is also
an equilibrium with  = 1 when  and  are below the threshold values. Figure 6 depicts
a numerical example of the multiple steady-state equilibria with  <  and  < .
[Figure 6 here.]
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Thus far, we assume that human capital productivity, represented by D, is common
between the two types of agents. However, D may represent a durable productive asset
such as generic ability, technology transfer, or business succession that children inherit
from parents. Based on this view, we can alternatively assume that the distribution of
D is positively correlated with human capital: DH > DL, where Di (i = H;L) is type-
i's human capital productivity (Gradstein and Justman, 1996). This assumption implies
that, on average, children born to higher-income families are endowed with greater human
capital productivity (Behrman and Taubman, 1989).
Under this alternative assumption, the law of motion of human capital when (qL; qH) =
(x; x) is reformulated as:
t+1 =
"
+
DH
DL
(1  )

1
t
  
1 # 1
:
This equation implies a stable steady-state equilibrium with  < 1, which seems more
realistic than the equilibrium with  = 1, which assumes DH = DL = D. However, the
qualitative results remain unchanged. Therefore, for the tractability of analysis, we keep
the assumption of DH = DL = D in the following analysis.
5 Welfare Analysis
We use simulations to investigate the model's welfare implications. In the analysis, we
set parameters ; ; ; and D as in the following. First, recall that 1   is the fraction
of type-H agents and only type-H agents opt out of public schooling. The fraction 1  
therefore represents enrollment in private institutions as a percentage. We set 1   
at 0:147 because the average rate in OECD countries was 14:7% in 2011. Second, the
estimate in Card and Krueger (1992) implies an elasticity of school quality of 0:12. In
addition, recent simulation studies suggest that  is in the range of 0:1   0:3 (Cardak,
2004) and 0:05  0:15 (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998). Following these earlier results, we
here set  = 0:15.
For ; we focus on the public education expenditure-GDP ratio in the steady-state
equilibrium distinguished by  = 1: The ratio in this equilibrium is x=h = =(1 + ).
Given  = 0:15; we can estimate  by using the average ratio x=h observed in selected
OECD countries. Table 1 lists 25 OECD countries and their Gini coecients (Panel (a))
and the percentage of enrollment in private secondary education (Panel (b)) in 2011. We
chose the countries in the top 50% in Panel (a) and those in the top 50% in Panel (b)
and dene this set as those that attain the steady state with  = 1. These countries are
Slovenia, Norway, the Czech Republic, Finland, and the Netherlands. The average ratio
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in these countries was 2:22% in 20111, so we can now determine  by solving 0:022 =
0:15=(1 + 0:15) for :  ' 0:151: This estimate ts well with that of 0:13 by Cardak
(2004) and that of 0:169 by de la Croix and Deopke (2004). Finally, we normalize D as
D = 1:
[Table 1 here.]
5.1 Utility Gap
We set the initial condition hL1 and h
H
1 to attain an equilibrium path that converges to
the unequal steady state with  < 1. Figure 6 plots the utility gap between type-L
and type-H agents along this equilibrium path. The ratio of type-L's utility to type-H's
utility represents the gap. Given the logarithmic form of the utility function, both types'
utility functions take negative values in the following numerical analysis. Hence, a ratio
greater than one implies that type-L's utility is lower than that of type-H. For example,
if V L =  1:2 and V H =  1:0, then the ratio is 1:2. A higher ratio implies a wider utility
gap.
[Figure 7 here.]
We investigate how the utility gap changes in response to the spread of the initial
inequality by considering a mean-preserving reduction of type-L's initial human capital,
where a reduction in hL1 is associated with an increase in h
H
1 , keeping the average h1
unchanged. Figure 7 plots the ratio from generation 1 to generation 80 for three cases of
initial conditions. The solid curve illustrates the baseline case and the dashed (dot-and-
dash) curve illustrates a higher (lower) initial inequality case. The gure shows that the
utility gap widens as the initial inequality increases, but the dierence between the three
cases disappears in the long run.
5.2 Compulsory Public School System
As a further investigation of the welfare implications, we introduce a compulsory public
school system as an alternative education regime and compare it to the mixed education
system analyzed thus far in terms of utility. In the present framework, the compulsory
public school system prohibits students from opting out of public school. Because of the
limited choice of education, the system forces the economy into a steady state with  = 1.
This is identical to the steady state with  = 1 in the mixed education system. Therefore,
we can evaluate the multiple stable steady-state equilibria in Proposition 2 in terms of
1Source: UNESCO statistics (http://data.uis.unesco.org/, February 14, 2016).
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utility by comparing the equilibrium with  < 1 in the mixed education system and the
equilibrium with  = 1 in the compulsory public school system.
For the analysis, we take the ratio of utility in the mixed education system to that
in the compulsory public school system and plot it from generation 1 to generation 80 in
Figure 8. Panels (a), (b), and (c) illustrate the ratios for type-L agents, type-H agents,
and social welfare (the population-weighted average utility of the two types of agents),
respectively.
[Figure 8 here.]
To interpret the result in Figure 8, we rst note the indirect utility of type-L agents:
V Lmix;t = ln
 
ht   xHt
 hLt
ht
+  lnD
 
hLt
1 
+  lnxHt ;
V Lcomp;t = ln (ht   xt )
hLt
ht
+  lnD
 
hLt
1 
+  lnxt ;
where V Lmix;t and V
L
comp;t are the indirect utility in the mixed education system and that
in the compulsory public education system, respectively.
The expressions show that introducing compulsory public education has two opposing
eects on type-L's utility. First, the tax burden decreases from xHt to x

t . Second,
per capita public education expenditure decreases from xHt to x

t . The numerical result
in Panel (a) shows that the latter negative eect outweighs the former positive one, so
introducing the compulsory public education system makes type-L agents in generation
1 worse o.
From generation 2 onward, there is an additional positive eect via the human cap-
ital formation generated by the compulsory public school system. The terms hLt =ht and
D
 
hLt
1 
in the above expressions illustrate this eect. This positive eect increases as
the initial inequality decreases. In addition, this eect amplies the tax reduction eect.
Therefore, for the baseline case and the low initial inequality case, introducing compulsory
public education makes generations from 2 onward better o. However, for the case of
high initial inequality, it takes a long time to realize this welfare improvement because
the negative eect remains stronger as the initial inequality increases. Type-L agents'
welfare improves only from generation 70 onward.
Panel (b) plots the ratio of type-H from generation 1 to 80. In the current setting,
they choose private education in the mixed education regime. Thus, their indirect utility
is:
V Hmix;t = ln
 
ht   xHt
 hHt
ht
+  lnD
 
hHt
1 
+  ln
 
ht   xHt
 hHt
ht
+

ln
1
1 + 
+  ln

1 + 

;
V Hcomp;t = ln (ht   xt )
hHt
ht
+  lnD
 
hHt
1 
+  lnxt ;
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where V Hmix;t and V
H
comp;t are the indirect utility in the mixed education system and that
in the compulsory public education system, respectively.
As in the case with type-L, introducing compulsory public education has two opposing
eects on type-H's utility in the initial period: the tax burden decreases from xHt to
xt and the expenditure for human capital formation decreases from
 
ht   xHt

hHt =ht
to xt . The numerical result in Panel (b) shows that the latter negative eect outweighs
the former positive one, so the change makes type-H agents in generation 1 worse o.
From generation 2 onward, these agents are also worse o because there is an additional
negative eect through the delay of human capital formation generated by the compulsory
public school system. The terms hHt =ht and D
 
hHt
1 
in the above expressions illustrate
this eect. The numerical result suggests that the shift from the mixed education to the
compulsory public school system is not Pareto-improving.
Finally, we investigate the eect of the compulsory public school system on social
welfare. The introduction decreases social welfare in period 1 because both types of agents
are worse o. However, the eect on welfare from period 2 onward depends on initial
inequality. Given the eect of the initial inequality described above, welfare improves
earlier as the initial inequality decreases, as illustrated in Panel (c). The result suggests
that the social welfare ranking of the multiple equilibria depends on the initial inequality
condition.
6 Conclusion
This study presents a political economy theory to explain why countries with higher in-
equality are associated with lower enrollment in public education. We base the theory on
a two-class (high and low), overlapping-generations model with human capital accumula-
tion and the choice to opt out of public education accompanied by voting on education
policy. This condition creates multiple, locally stable steady-state equilibria: one with
low inequality and high enrolment in public education and the other with high inequality
and low enrolment in public education. This study is novel in that it shows this negative
correlation, which we observe in OECD countries, in the mutual interaction of inequality
and education.
From the equity viewpoint, it is desirable to attain the low-inequality steady state.
One path to this steady state involves introducing compulsory public schooling. We used
a simulation to investigate the welfare implications of introducing this reform and nd
that it makes high-income families worse o, while improving the lot of future generations
of low-income families at the expense of the current generation. The results suggest that
the multiple equilibria are not Pareto-ranked, and that the shift from the existing mixed
education system to a compulsory public school system is not Pareto-improving.
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We demonstrated these results by making several assumptions that make the analysis
tractable. In particular, we assume two classes and that the low-type agents constitute the
majority in every period. This assumption enables an analytical solution to the model and
an illustration of the multiple, locally stable steady-state equilibria observed in empirical
studies. A future extension could include probabilistic voting, a la Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987), to reect the preferences of both types of agents. While this type of analysis is
ideal, the analysis is rather complicated and best left for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of ^
We compare xL (t; ht) and x
H (t; ht) to obtain
xL (t; ht) < x
H (t; ht)
, 0 <  (t)  (1  ) (t)2  
n
(1 + )(1+)= + (1  )
o
t + (1 + )
(1+)= :
The function  (t) has the following properties:
 (0) = (1 + )(1+)= > 0;
 0 (0) =  
n
(1 + )(1+)= + (1  )
o
< 0;
 (1) = ( 1)(1  )2 < 0:
Therefore,  (t) = 0 has two distinct solutions: t 2 (0; 1); and t > 1: By solving
 (t) = 0 directly, we obtain a smaller solution denoted by ^; as in (6).

A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that type-L adults, as a majority, choose xt below x
L (t; ht) : The condition in (7)
states that their political objective is 
t = 
ee;t which is independent of xt: Alternatively,
suppose that they choose xt above x
L (t; ht) : Their political objective is 
t = 
xx;t
maximized at xt = x

t  1+ht. The solution of xt is feasible if xL (t; ht) < xt , or if
t  (1 + (1  )) < (1 + )(1+)= :
This sucient condition holds because the upper limit of the left-hand side is 1 + ,
which is less than the right-hand side, (1 + )(1+)=. Therefore, type-L adults choose
xt = x

t if and only if 
ee;t < 
xx;tjxt=xt . By direct calculation, we obtain

ee;t < 
xx;tjxt=xt ,  ln t < 0;
which holds for any t 2 [^; 1) :

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A.3 Proof of
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
= < ^
To compare
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
= and ^, we rst reformulate the term z inp
z:
z =
n
(1 + )(1+)= + (1  )
o2
  4(1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
=
n
(1 + )(1+)=   (1  )
o2
+ 4(1  )2 (1 + )(1+)= :
Using this new form, we have
1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
< ^
, pz < (1 + )(1+)=   (1  ) + 2(1  )2 (1 + )(1+)=
,
n
(1 + )(1+)=   (1  )
o2
+ 4(1  )2 (1 + )(1+)=
<
h
(1 + )(1+)=   (1  ) + 2(1  )2 (1 + )(1+)=
i2
, 1 +  < (1 + )(1+)= ;
which holds for any  2 (0; 1).

A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
First, look at Panel (a) of Figure 4. We have already shown 
ee;t < 
xx;tjxt=xt for case
(a). In addition, from the gure, we observe

xx;tjxt=xt < 
xe;tjxt=xt
< 
xe;tjxt=xt ;
where the rst inequality comes from 
xx;t < 
xe;t 8xt, and the second inequality from
argmax
xe;t = x

t . Thus, 
t is maximized at xt = x

t = argmax
xe;t if  2 (; 1) and
t 2 (0; ].
Second, look at Panel (b) of Figure 4. With the property 
ee;t < 
xx;tjxt=xt , the
following holds:

ee;t < 
xx;tjxt=xt
< 
xe;tjxt=xt
< 
xe;tjxt=xH(t;ht) :
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Thus, 
t is maximized at xt = x
H (t; ht) if
 2 (; 1) and t 2

;
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
=
i
:
Finally, look at Panel (c) of Figure 4. The solution is either xt = x
H (t; ht) or
xt = x

t  argmax
xx;t. By comparing 
xe;tjxt=xH(t;ht) and 
xx;tjxt=xt ; we obtain

xe;tjxt=xH(t;ht) ? 
xx;tjxt=xt
, ln  ht   xH (t; ht) t +  lnxH (t; ht) ? ln (ht   xt ) t +  lnxt
, ln ht   x
H (t; ht)
ht   xt
?  ln x

t
xH (t; ht)
,
ht    
1 t
1 

1 t
1  +(1+)
(1+)=ht
ht   xt
?
2664 1+ht 1 t
1 

1 t
1  +(1+)
(1+)=ht
3775

,
(1 + ) 
h
(1  )  + 1 
1 t (1 + )
(1+)=
i
 + 1 
1 t (1 + )
(1+)=
?
"
 + 1 
1 t (1 + )
(1+)=
1 + 
#
,  + 1  
1  t (1 + )
(1+)=    ?
"
 + 1 
1 t (1 + )
(1+)=
1 + 
#1+
(12)
Let zt   + 1 1 t (1 + )
(1+)= : Then, the expression in (12) is reformulated as

xe;tjxt=xH(t;ht) ? 
xx;tjxt=xt , zt   | {z }
LHS
?

zt
1 + 
1+
| {z }
RHS
; (13)
where the range of zt corresponding to t 2

1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
; ^

is
1 +   zt <  + 1  
1  ^ (1 + )
(1+)= : (14)
The LHS and RHS in (13) have the following properties:
LHSjzt=1+ = 1 + (1  ) > RHSjzt=1+ = 1;
LHSjzt=+ 1 1 ^t (1+)(1+)= < RHSjzt=+ 1 1 ^t (1+)(1+)= :
As illustrated in Figure A.1, there is a critical value of zt and a corresponding value of t,
denoted by , such that

xe;tjxt=xH(t;ht) ? 
xx;tjxt=xt , t 7 
:
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Thus, 
t is maximized at xt = x
H (t; ht) if t 2

1

n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
; 
i
;
and maximized at xt = x
 if t 2 (; ^).
[Figure A.1.]

A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
The condition in (11) implies that if  2  1
2
; 

; the threshold value
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
=
is non-positive and the result in case (b.1.3) applies. Thus, we obtain
argmax
t =

xH (t; ht) if  2
 
1
2
; 

and t 2 (0; ] ;
xt if  2
 
1
2
; 

and t 2 (; ^) :
If  2 (; ] ; the threshold value
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
= is positive.
Case (b.1.2) applies when t 2

0;
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
=
i
; and case (b.1.3)
applies when t 2
n
1  (1  ) (1 + )(1+)=
o
=; ^

. Thus, we obtain
argmax
t =

xH (t; ht) if  2 (; ] and t 2 (0; ] ;
xt if  2 (; ] and t 2 (; ^) :
Summarizing the results thus far leads to the statement in Lemma 3

A.6 Derivation of Px () ; P core () ; and P inte ()
First, assume t 2 (; 1): both types of agents choose public education, (qL; qH) = (x; x).
The average human capital in period t+ 1 is
ht+1 = h
L
t+1 + (1  )hHt+1
= D
 
hLt
1 
(xt)
 + (1  )D  hHt 1  (xt) :
Using this expression, we can reformulate t+1 = h
L
t+1=ht+1 as
t+1 =
D
 
hLt
1 
(xt)

D (hLt )
1 
(xt)
 + (1  )D (hHt )1  (xt)
=
"
+ (1  )

hHt
hLt
1 # 1
=
"
+ (1  )

1
t
  
1 # 1
;
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where the equality in the third line comes from hHt =h
L
t = (1=t   ) =(1  ):
Next, assume t 2 (0; ]: type-L agents choose public education and type-H agents
choose private education. Type-H's human capital equation is
hHt+1 = D
 
hHt
1   
1 + 
(1  t)hHt

= DhHt


1 + 
 
1  xt
ht

;
where the rst equality comes from the private education function, eHt =  (1  t)hHt = (1 + ),
and the second equality comes from the government budget constraint, xt = tht. With
hLt+1 = D
 
hLt
1 
(xt)
 ; the period t+ 1 inequality index, t+1, becomes
t+1 =
D
 
hLt
1 
(xt)

D (hLt )
1 
(xt)
 + (1  )DhHt


1+
 
1  xt
ht

=
24+ (1  )hHt


1+
 
1  xt
ht

(hLt )
1 
(xt)

35 1 : (15)
Assume the corner solution, xt = x
H (t; ht) : From (5),
xt = x
H (t; ht) 
 1 t
1 
 1 t
1  + (1 + )
(1+)=
ht:
Substituting this into (15) and rearranging the terms, we obtain P core () as in the text.
Alternatively, assume the interior solution, xt = x

t = ht=(1 + ): Substituting this
into (15) and rearranging the terms, we obtain P inte () as in the text.

A.7 Properties of Px () ; P core () ; and P inte ()
(i) Claim 1: Px () ; P core () ; and P inte () are strictly increasing in t.
This claim is immediate from the expressions of Px () ; P core () ; and P inte () in the
text.
(ii) Claim 2: P inte () R P core () if and only if t R :
We directly compare P inte () and P core () and obtain
P inte () R P core (), (1  )

1  t
(1  ) t
 

1 + 
(1  t) + (1 + )1=

R


1 + 

(1  t)

1
t
1 
, t R  
  (1  )
n
 + (1 + )(1+)=
o
 f (1 + )  g :
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(iii) Claim 3: P core () < Px () 8t 2 (0; 1):
We directly compare P core () and Px () and obtain
P core () ? Px ()
, (1  )

1
t
  
1 
? (1  )

1  t
(1  ) t
 

1 + 
(1  t) + (1 + )1=

, 1 + t ? (1 + )(1+)= ;
where the left-hand side of the second line is less than 1+ because t < 1; whereas the
right-hand side is larger than 1+ . Therefore, P core () < Px () holds for any parameter
values.
(iv) Claim 4: Px () satises Px (1) = 1 and P 0x (1) = 1   2 (0; 1):
Px (1) = 1 is immediate from the denition of Px () in the text. The rst dierentiation
of Px () with respect to  is
P 0x (t) =
"
+ (1  )

1
t
  
1 # 2
(1  ) (1  )

1
t
  
 
1
(t)
2 :
We evaluate this at t = 1 to obtain P
0
x (1) = 1   2 (0; 1):
(v) Claim 5: P core () satises P core (0) = 0 and lim!0 (@P core () =@t) = 1; P inte ()
satises P inte (0) = 0 and lim!0 (@P
int
e () =@t) =1.
We obtain P core (0) = 0 and P
int
e (0) = 0 by directly substituting t = 0 into P
cor
e ()
and P inte (). To show lim!0 (@P core () =@t) = 1; we dierentiate P core () with respect
to t. After rearranging the terms, we obtain
@P core ()
@t
=
1
(t)
2 

(1  )
1 + 
+
1  
1  t (1 + )
1=
 24(1  ) + t 1+

1+
+ (1+)
1=
1 t
35


+ (1  )

1  t
(1  ) t
 

1 + 
(1  t) + (1 + )1=
 2
:
This expression is further reformulated as
@P core ()
@t
=

1
t
 
(1  )
1 + 
+
1  
1  t (1 + )
1=
 24(1  ) + t 1+

1+
+ (1+)
1=
1 t
35


(t)
1  + (1  )

1  t
1  
 

1 + 
(1  t) + (1 + )1=
 2
:
Evaluating this at t = 0; we nd that the term (1=t)
 approaches innity, whereas the re-
maining term attains a constant and nite value. Therefore, we obtain lim!0 (@P core () =@t) =
1.
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To show lim!0 (@P inte () =@t) = 1; we follow the same procedure described above.
Dierentiating P inte () with respect to t yields
@P inte ()
@t
=


1 + 

[t + (1  ) (1  t)]

"
()2 (t)
2  + 2


1 + 

(1  t) t +


1 + 
2
(1  t)2 (t)
# 1
:
We evaluate this at t = 0 and obtain
lim
t!0
@P inte ()
@t
=


1 + 

[0 + (1  ) (1  0)] (0) 1 = +1:

A.8 Existence of  and 
Here, we show that there are critical values of  and ; denoted by  and ; respectively,
such that
P core (
)   holds if  <  and  2  1=2;  ;
P core (
) >  holds otherwise.
First, note that  satises 
xe;tjxt=xH(t;ht) ? 
xx;tjxt=xt ; or 
 =  (). Using
this expression, we reformulate P core (
) ?  as
P core (
) ?  , (1  ) + 1  
1   () (1 + )
(1+)=| {z }
LHS
7 1 + 
 ()| {z }
RHS
: (16)
The terms LHS and RHS in (16) satisfy the following properties:
LHSj=1=2 =
1
2
"
 +
(1 + )(1+)=
1   (1=2) =2
#
;
RHSj=1=2 =
1 + 
 (1=2)
;
LHSj=1 = 0 < RHSj=1 =
1 + 
 (1)
:
Figure A.2 illustrates LHS and RHS assuming @LHS=@ < @RHS=@ 8 2 (1=2; 1).
The gure shows that (i) when LHSj=1=2 > RHSj=1=2, there is a threshold value of
, denoted by  2 (1=2; 1); such that LHS ? RHS ,  7 ; (ii) when LHSj=1=2 
RHSj=1=2, LHS < RHS holds 8 2 (1=2; 1). Therefore, the relative value of LHSj=1=2
and RHSj=1=2 are crucial to determining the magnitude of the relationship between LHS
and RHS.
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[Figure A.2 is here.]
Figure A.3 illustrates LHSj=1=2 and RHSj=1=2, taking the value of  from 0 to 1:
The gure shows that there is a critical value of ; denoted by  2 (0; 1); such that
LHSj=1=2 ? RHSj=1=2 if  7 :
The results thus far are: (i) P core (
)   holds if  <  and  2  1=2; ; and (ii)
P core (
) >  holds otherwise.
[Figure A.3 is here.]

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Figure 1: Gini co-ecient and enrollment (percentage) in private secondary education in-
stitutions in 2011. Source: World Bank Indicator (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator);
OECD Statics (http://stats.oecd.org/).
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Figure 2: The political objective function 
t when t 2 [^; 1):
31
Figure 3: Period t voting solution classied according to  and t.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 4: Three potential patterns of 
t when t 2 (0; ^).
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5: Three possible patterns of P () for the case of  2 (; 1).
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Figure 6: A numerical example of P (). Parameters are set at  = 0:853,  = 0:15, and
 = 0:151.
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(a)
Slovenia 0.248
Norway 0.25
Denmark 0.251
Iceland 0.257
Czech Republic 0.262
Slovak Republic 0.263
Finland 0.264
Sweden 0.273
Luxembourg 0.279
Austria 0.282
Netherland 0.283
Switerland 0.289
Germany 0.291
Ireland 0.302
Poland 0.305
France 0.309
Canada 0.315
New Zealand 0.323
Italy 0.324
Estonia 0.334
Greece 0.337
Spain 0.342
Portugal 0.343
United Kingdom 0.344
Israel 0.371
(b)
Ireland 0.69839
Slovenia 1.49191
Netherland 3.32049
Estonia 3.41722
Poland 4.34424
Greece 4.66068
Canada 7.35733
Norway 8.16549
Czech Republic 8.44604
Italy 8.52017
Germany 8.7558
Finland 9.36146
Austria 9.48843
Switzerland 9.72711
Slovak Republic 9.81426
New Zealand 10.92371
Israel 11.93098
Iceland 12.39742
Denmark 13.80195
Portugal 16.32851
Luxembourg 17.92853
Sweden 19.38773
France 26.15038
Spain 27.30868
United Kingdom 29.42805
Table 1: Gini coecients (Panel (a)) and enrollment (percentage) in private secondary ed-
ucation institutions (Panel (b)) in selected OECD countries in 2011. Source: World Bank
Indicator (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator); OECD Statics (http://stats.oecd.org/).
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Figure 7: Ratio of type-L's utility to type-H's utility from generation 1 to 80.
37
0 20 40 60 80
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
0 20 40 60 80
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
0 20 40 60 80
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
hL1=0.0165, h
H
1 =0.05
hL1=0.0145, h
H
1 =0.061605
hL1=0.0185, h
H
1 =0.038395
Figure 8: Ratio of mixed education systems to compulsory public school systems in terms
of type-L's utility (Panel (a)), type-H's utility (Panel (b)), and social welfare (Panel (c)).
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Figure A.1: LHS and RHS of condition (13).
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(a) (b)
Figure A.2: LHS and RHS of condition (16).
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Figure A.3: LHS and RHS of condition (16) when  = 1
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